Digital Warfare in the Middle East and Ukraine: How Drones and Cyber ​​Warfare Are Rewriting the Rules of Conflict

John

By John

There remote death which is decimating the top of the Hezbollah in Lebanon hey cyber war drones that leave no escape, they overturn the conflict scenarios in Middle East and in Ukraine. The synchronized explosions of wireless devices activated by theIsraeli intelligence against the Lebanese Islamic militiasrepresents an impressive preview of theDigital acceleration of war. “This could be the first, frightening glimpse of a world in which, ultimately, no electronic device, from our cell phones to our thermostats, can ever be trusted completely,” he noted on New York Times Glenn Gerstellfor years General Counsel of the National Security Agency. In addition to the enormous psychological effect of the vulnerabilitythe remote warthe remote warfare as it has been defined, interrupts the communications and blinds wireless devices, providing a huge, if temporary, advantage that allows for concentric attacks while the enemy is inert and unable to defend itself. But supremacy high tech Of Israel and of theWesthowever effective and functional, cannot replace the politics and the strategytrue key elements for resolving a complex conflict with ancestral roots such as the Middle Eastern one.

Similar considerations apply to the long concave and convex front of the war unleashed by Putin’s Russia against theUkraine. With the big difference that in addition to the overwhelming technological, armament and intelligence superiority of the total war support ensured by United States, Great Britain, Born and Europe to Ukraine with respect to Russian military potential, on the situation of the bloody clashes currently underway between Moscow’s forces and those of Kyiv the errors and disasters of weigh heavily Putin. The first – and most serious – of these disasters was the initial catastrophic belief that the Ukrainian army would immediately fall apart or not fight at all. This led to the destruction of Russia’s professional army and its forced and improvised replacement with a mobilization army, numerically much larger but technically much less capable and terribly unprepared for a protracted conflict. The second very serious mistake concerns the underestimation not only of Ukraine but also of the West.

The rate of emptying of these deposits is monitored via satellite and on the basis of the processing and the examination of theintelligence It is foreseeable that Russia’s offensive military potential may be exhausted by the 2025. Although hypothetical and optimistic, the analysis predicts that if this logistical collapse were to occur, the Russians would at most be able to defend themselves within their own borders. Which, even if it would increase the nuclear risk threshold, would in any case represent the suicide of the Putin regime. Mirage or not, the assumption of the analytical elaborations is represented by the ability to destroy the strategic nodes on Russian territory.

Attacks deep inside Russia with US and British long-range missiles are the key to the plan to end the war that Zelensky will illustrate next Thursday at Washington to the President Joe Biden and to the candidates for the November 5 elections for the White House, Kamala Harris And Donald Trump. The meeting with the Republican candidate who has always been blatantly pro-Putin could be a sign that even in theOld party Kiev’s chances are on the rise. Who was indignant, reunited and mobilized, has awakened the Born from its long hibernation and deployed all the potential of the war industry, the capabilities of global intelligence and the hitherto unknown resources of the cyber war.

The third Putinian disaster is attributable to the blind obstinacy with which the Russian army, after having retreated from the front, Kyiv and from that of Kharkiv led the offensive in Donbassfueling it with a partial mobilization, absolutely insufficient to train and commit the forces necessary to attempt to break through the front. And despite this obvious and tragic deficit, the disaster was amplified by frontal assaults at a very high cost in men and equipment that consumed the existing potential at a rate greater than that with which it could be replaced. The fourth terrible blunder is the concentration on a single front between Donetsk And Luhansk of all invading forces, leaving the borders of their country undefended and allowing the sensational counterattack of the Ukrainian army’s invasion of the Russian region of Kurks.